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In this Article, I review the military and security uses of robotics and “un-
manned” or “uninhabited” (and sometimes “remotely piloted”) vehicles in a 
number of relevant conflict environments that, in turn, raise issues of law and 
ethics that bear significantly on both foreign and domestic policy initiatives. My 
treatment applies to the use of autonomous unmanned platforms in combat and 
low-intensity international conflict, but also offers guidance for the increased 
domestic uses of both remotely controlled and fully autonomous unmanned aeri-
al, maritime, and ground systems for immigration control, border surveillance, 
drug interdiction, and domestic law enforcement. I outline the emerging debate 
concerning “robot morality” and computational models of moral cognition and 
examine the implications of this debate for the future reliability, safety, and effec-
tiveness of autonomous systems (whether weaponized or unarmed) that might 
come to be deployed in both domestic and international conflict situations. Like-
wise, I discuss attempts by the International Committee on Robot Arms Control 
(ICRAC) to outlaw or ban the use of autonomous systems that are lethally armed, 
as well an alternative proposal by the eminent Yale University ethicist, Wendell 
Wallach, to have lethally armed autonomous systems that might be capable of 
making targeting decisions independent of any human oversight specifically des-
ignated “mala in se” under international law. Following the approach of 
Marchant, et al., however, I summarize the lessons learned and the areas of pro-
visional consensus reached thus far in this debate in the form of “soft-law” pre-
cepts that reflect emergent norms and a growing international consensus regard-
ing the proper use and governance of such weapons.  
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I. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS & LAW FOR UNMANNED 
SYSTEMS 
The period from 2007 to 2013 witnessed an enormous outpouring of work 
devoted to the ethical and (far less frequently) the legal implications of military 
robotics. The inspiration for these studies stemmed from both the tremendous 
advances in the technologies themselves and the consequent dramatic increase 
in their roles in the conduct of military conflicts in many regions of the world.  
These studies encompass Australian philosopher Robert Sparrow’s inaugu-
ral essay, Killer Robots, and a subsequent, similarly titled book by Arman 
Krishnan.1 A detailed and path-breaking survey of the ethical dilemmas posed 
by the increased use of such technologies prepared for the U.S. Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) by renowned computer scientist and roboticist, George Bekey, 
and his philosophy colleagues Patrick Lin and Keith Abney at California State 
Polytechnic University2 heralded, in turn, the widely read and enormously in-
fluential treatment of the emerging ethical challenges and foreign policy impli-
cations of military robotics, Wired for War, by Brookings Institution senior fel-
low Peter W. Singer.3  
The vast majority of these works focus on the ethical ramifications at-
tendant upon the increased military uses of robotic technologies, reflecting the 
relevant lack of attention by legal scholars to the status of robotics in interna-
tional law. The current status of domestic and international law governing ro-
botics, however, together with a range of proposals for effective future govern-
ance of these technologies, was recently articulated by Arizona State University 
Law Professor, Gary Marchant, and several colleagues in the Consortium on 
Emerging Technologies, Military Operations, and National Security 
(CETMONS).4 The legal and moral implications of military robotics constitut-
ed the main focus of a special issue of the Journal of Military Ethics5 and of 
subsequent anthologies edited by Lin, Abney, and Bekey and, most recently, 
 
 1.  ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS 
WEAPONS (2009); Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 62 (2007). 
 2. PATRICK LIN ET AL., AUTONOMOUS MILITARY ROBOTICS: RISK, ETHICS, AND 
DESIGN (2008), available at http://ethics.calpoly.edu/ONR_report.pdf.  
 3.  P. W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2009). 
 4.  Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Ro-
bots, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272 (2011). For more recent works, see Michael N. 
Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the 
Critics, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. FEATURES 1 (Feb. 5, 2013), available at http://harvardnsj.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf; 
and Jeffrey S. Thurnher, The Law That Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17 ASIL 
INSIGHTS 1 (Jan. 18, 2013), available at http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/                  
insight130118.pdf.  
 5.  New Warriors and New Weapons: Ethics & Emerging Military Technologies, 9 J. 
MIL. ETHICS 1 (2010). 
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Bradley J. Strawser, along with a book-length treatment of aerial robotics 
(“drones”) from an operational perspective by Colonel M. Shane Riza, USAF.6 
It is worth pausing to reflect on what we have learned about the legal, mor-
al, and policy implications of these trends as a result of these numerous and 
substantial efforts. First, while the technologies themselves are designed to op-
erate in the domains of air, land, and sea, as well as in space, the majority of the 
discussion has centered on “unmanned” or remotely piloted, lethally armed aer-
ial platforms (such as Predators and Reapers). That in turn stems from the high-
ly effective use of these aerial platforms in surveillance operations, sometimes 
resulting in “targeted killing” of selected high-value adversaries by the United 
States and its allies. Indeed, it is often difficult to disentangle the discussions of 
aerial robotic technologies either from their controversial tactical deployment 
in such operations, or from the long-term strategic consequences of America’s 
willingness to engage in such tactics. The tactical uses and strategic conse-
quences of these policies involving unmanned systems, however, are quite dis-
tinct from the moral dilemmas posed by the vastly wider development and use 
of these systems themselves. 
It is particularly unfortunate that the otherwise important policy discus-
sions and moral debates surrounding the longstanding practice of targeted kill-
ing tends to obscure the fact that some of the most effective and justifiable uses 
of military robotics have been in unarmed ground operations, ranging from ex-
ploration of booby-trapped caves in Tora Bora, to battlefield rescue and casual-
ty extraction, to dismantling IEDs or assisting in humanitarian relief opera-
tions.7 Meanwhile, some of the most promising future developments in military 
 
 6.  KILLING BY REMOTE CONTROL: THE ETHICS OF AN UNMANNED MILITARY (Bradley 
Jay Strawser, ed., 2013); M. SHANE RIZA, KILLING WITHOUT HEART: LIMITS ON ROBOTIC 
WARFARE IN AN AGE OF PERSISTENT CONFLICT (2013); ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS (Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & George A. Bekey eds., 
2011); see also Heather M. Roff, Killing in War: Responsibility, Liability and Lethal Auton-
omous Robots, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR: JUST WAR THEORY IN THE 
20TH CENTURY 348-364 (Fritz Allhoff et al. eds., 2013); Joshua Foust, A Liberal Case for 
Drones, FOREIGN POLICY (May 14, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/ 
14/a_liberal_case_for_drones.  
 7.  A sense of the range of applications available can be found in many places, from 
the Unmanned Systems Roadmap of the U.S. Department of Defense, to the Unmanned Aer-
iel Systems online newsletter containing articles documenting the present and near-future 
use of unmanned systems for mapping coral reefs, monitoring the arctic environment, and 
apprehending drug trafficking. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNMANNED SYSTEMS ROADMAP: 
2007-2032 (2007); UAS VISION, http://www.uasvision.com/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). An 
upcoming small systems business expo includes feature articles on the uses of unmanned 
systems in humanitarian relief operations in Haiti, fighting forest fires, and agricultural crop 
spraying. SMALL UNMANNED SYSTEMS BUSINESS EXPO, http://susbexpo.com/ (last visited Jan. 
8, 2014). A recent GAO report detailing FAA preparations for these uses also cites risks and 
abuses, ranging from unsafe operations of model aircraft operating too close to pedestrians at 
the University of Virginia, to apprehension of a domestic terrorist who was rigging a similar 
model system to carry plastic explosives in a planned attack on the White House. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (2012), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648348.pdf. Descriptions of uses of unmanned systems for 
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robotics will likely be realized in the maritime and underwater environment (in 
surface combat or anti-submarine warfare, for example), as well as when some 
of these systems return home from the warfront and are employed in a variety 
of domestic or regional security operations (border security, immigration con-
trol, drug and human trafficking, kidnapping, or disaster response and relief fol-
lowing hurricanes, floods earthquakes and massive wildfires) to which scant 
attention has thus far been paid (apart from implied threats to individual priva-
cy).  
During the Cold War, for example, it was often the case that submarines 
from rival superpowers engaged in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR) missions in contested waters, keeping an eye on the adversary’s 
movements and interests in a particular sector, and perhaps playing games of 
“cat and mouse” and even “chicken,” to assess everything from noise detection 
to the maneuverability and other technical capabilities of different models of 
submarines as well as to test the effectiveness of coastal defenses. With the de-
mise of the superpower rivalry and the Cold War, however, it has been some 
time since any naval force could routinely expend the resources necessary to 
continue such Tom Clancy-like, macho underwater scenarios. They are simply 
too risky and resource intensive.  
Our strategic focus, meanwhile, has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific, 
and from Russia to China, as our treaty partners like Japan, South Korea, and 
the Philippines contend with one another and with the Chinese mainland for 
control of resource-rich areas of the South China Sea. Here a more typical sce-
nario would involve an underwater ISR mission near the Diayu/Sinkaku is-
lands, carried out by the United States in support of the interests of one of our 
principal allies, like Japan or South Korea. That operation today can be more 
efficiently and cost-effectively undertaken by deploying a single-manned vessel 
as an ISR command center, equipped with a variety of unmanned underwater 
vehicles (UUVs), each programmed to operate semi-autonomously in carrying 
out a series of task-oriented maneuvers in much the same way, and even fol-
lowing much the same command or decision-tree script that human command-
ers would have followed in an earlier era. 
In an underwater “runtime environment,” for example, robots behave, or 
are programmed to behave, with about the same degree of autonomy as a hu-
man commander of an individual manned ISR platform: that is, the operational 
or mission orders are for either type of vehicle to search, find, report, and either 
 
multiple purposes in the marine environment can be found in the 2012 annual report of the 
multi-institutional Consortium on Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER). 
CONSORTIUM ON UNMANNED SYSTEMS EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, FY12 ANNUAL REPORT 
(2012), available at http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/1314/612480/ 
CRUSER_AnnualReport_FY2012.pdf. An enormous archive of 3-dimensional visual proto-
types in all relevant environments can be found online. See SAVAGE X3D EXAMPLES 
ARCHIVE, https://savage.nps.edu/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (requires installation of an exten-
sion 3-D (X#D) plug-in, available on this site). 
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continue the mission or return to the command center (or to another specified 
rendezvous point).8 This kind of mission can prove to be dull, dirty, routinely 
dangerous (for the manned platform), and certainly boring, until, that is, an ad-
versary’s submarine is observed carrying out exploratory mining surveys on the 
ocean floor. In a plausible “war-game” scenario, we might posit that the adver-
sary then attempts to evade detection by fleeing into a prohibited marine sanc-
tuary under the administrative control of yet another party to the dispute (e.g. 
the Philippines). The hypothetical semi-autonomous UUV would then face ex-
actly the same legal and moral dilemma as would confront the human com-
mander of a conventional manned submarine under otherwise-identical circum-
stances: namely, to continue the military mission of tracking the enemy or to 
refuse to violate international law and norms by hesitating to enter these pro-
hibited, “no-go” waters. Standard operating procedures and “standing orders” 
defining the mission would require the human commander to “contact opera-
tional headquarters” for clearance, or else discontinue the mission. The UUV 
can relatively easily be programmed to do likewise, thereby incorporating the 
constraints of law and morality within the parameters of the rules of engage-
ment defining this well-defined (and what I have elsewhere termed “highly 
scripted”) mission.9  
This seems a clear and relatively straightforward situation, for which we 
have unfortunate precedent in the human case.10 The underlying question of 
this hypothetical case is whether (perhaps as a result of this precedent) to build 
a corresponding “rule of engagement” constraint for this mission that would 
override the tactical priorities of military necessity in deference to the require-
ments of law and good international relations. What seems equally clear at pre-
sent is that we lack the technical capability to design a UUV with sufficient in-
dependent decision-making capacity to simulate the “swagger” of one of Tom 
Clancy’s human commanders during the Cold-War era, and to decide on its 
 
 8.  Donald P. Brutzman et al., Run-Time Ethics Checking for Autonomous Unmanned 
Vehicles: Developing a Practical Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 18TH INTERNATIONAL 
SYMPOSIUM ON UNMANNED UNTETHERED SUBMERSIBLE TECHNOLOGY (August 13, 2013), 
available at https://savage.nps.edu/AuvWorkbench/documentation/papers/UUST2013 Prac-
ticalRuntimeAUVEthics.pdf.  
 9.  I define highly scripted security missions utilizing lethally armed autonomous sys-
tems in George R. Lucas, Jr., Industrial Challenges of Military Robotics, 10 J. MIL. ETHICS 
274 (2011). A similar account of where and how to attain design success in ethical machine 
behavior can be found in Robert Sparrow, Building a Better Warbot: Ethical Issues in the 
Design of Unmanned Systems for Military Applications, 15 J. SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 
169 (2009). The appeal for human executive oversight provides for the possibility of overrid-
ing the legal prohibition, but renders the unmanned system in this instance merely “semi-
autonomous” rather than fully autonomous, because the accountability for the decision rests 
with the human commander approving the action, not the unmanned platform.  
 10.  An actual U.S. Navy mine-sweeper took such a detour with unfortunate and widely 
publicized results. See U.S. Navy Ship Runs Aground in the Philippines, CBSNEWS.COM 
(Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57564485/u.s-navy-ship-runs-
aground-in-the-philippines. 
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own to override this legal constraint and venture into the “no-go” zone in 
search of the “bogie.”  
Happily, meeting the normal demands of law and morality does not require 
such a complicated, and likely infeasible, feat of engineering. Moreover, were 
we to design and program our unmanned undersea system to perform in the 
more or less straightforward manner otherwise described, we would have both 
duplicated the conventional behavior of a fully manned system, while simulta-
neously fulfilling what I have elsewhere defined as the “Arkin Test” or Arkin-
constraint for robot morality: that is, we would have succeeded in designing, 
programming, and deploying a well-governed, reliable unmanned system that 
could almost certainly perform as well or even better (from a moral and legal 
perspective) than human beings under similar or identical circumstances.11 
Even if I am correct in this claim, it may seem that I have cheated or 
“fudged” the boundary conditions to arrive at this result. Apart from whales, 
dolphins, and perhaps the intrepid underwater explorer, James Cameron, there 
are not a large number of civilian noncombatants wandering the undersea envi-
ronment. Just as with Russian and American submarines during the Cold War, 
it is primarily adversaries (and some military allies) that one is likely to en-
counter there, lessening considerably the prospect of accidentally or uninten-
tionally doing harm to innocents (collateral damage). On balance, that is to say, 
the undersea environment affords a relatively uncomplicated moral context 
within which to operate in comparison, say, to that of soldiers in a brigade 
combat team (or lethally armed robots) entering a local village in search of in-
surgents, let alone of a UAV making its own, wholly unsupervised targeting 
decisions and executing a full-blown “kill-chain” command unilaterally in mid-
flight. It is the latter prospects that have raised the specter of uncontrolled and 
morally unaccountable “killer robots” run amok, and led ethicists like Wendell 
Wallach (Yale University) to propose having such systems declared “mala in 
se,”12 while roboticists like Noel Sharkey and his colleagues in ICRAC to de-
 
 11.  This criterion—that robots comply as or more effectively with applicable con-
straints of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) on their use of force and doing of harm than 
human combatants under similar circumstances—constitutes what I have termed the “Arkin 
Test” for robot “morality” (although that is likewise somewhat misleading, as the criterion 
pertains straightforwardly to compliance with international law, not with the exhibiting of 
moral judgment). In this sense, the test for “morality” (i.e., for the limited ability to comply 
with legal restrictions on the use of force) is similar to the “Turing Test” for machine intelli-
gence: we have satisfied the demand when machine behavior is indistinguishable from (let 
alone better than) human behavior in any given context. I have outlined this test in several 
places. See, e.g., George R. Lucas, Jr., Postmodern War, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 289 (2010). For 
greater detail, see George R. Lucas, Jr., Engineering, Ethics, and Industry: The Moral Chal-
lenges of Lethal Autonomy, in KILLING BY REMOTE CONTROL 221 (Bradley Jay Strawser ed., 
2013). 
 12.  Wendell Wallach, Terminating the Terminator: What to Do about Autonomous 
Weapons, SCIENCE PROGRESS (Jan. 29, 2013), http://scienceprogress.org/2013/01/ 
terminating-the-terminator-what-to-do-about-autonomous-weapons. 
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mand that the very development, let alone deployment of lethally armed auton-
omous systems be outlawed altogether.13 
The UUV in the present example, however, is not lethally armed (at least, 
not yet), and it is only semi-autonomous (although, as described, it possesses 
essentially as much autonomy as a human operator or commander is authorized 
to exercise). This may seem to make consideration of moral dilemmas and legal 
challenges appear overly simplified. But that is not a bad thing. If the issue of 
military or security robots behaving ethically, let alone of their coming to exer-
cise a computational analogue of human moral judgment, seems a complex and 
controversial matter as well as a formidable engineering challenge, then why 
not start with something simpler? What this example of the underwater runtime 
environment demonstrates is that we might feasibly design, build, program, 
test, and ultimately deploy reliable systems with only minimal “intelligence” 
and autonomy that nonetheless meet the demands of law and morality when 
operating in their defined battlespace.  
II. DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDIES 
By continuing to focus our work even more precisely on this somewhat 
simplified moral environment, we might learn lessons about how subsequently 
to approach the more complicated problems on the water’s surface, on land, 
and in the air, as well as learning what to anticipate when we enter these areas.  
For example, we can add a bit more complexity to our working underwater 
scenario. What if our UUV continues to tail the enemy and is fired upon? Do 
we arm it defensively against this possibility, and if so, does it return fire? Or 
does it take evasive action only? Or does it abort the mission and return to the 
host ship? Once again, in another era, human commanders, both on the surface 
and underwater, routinely confronted such decisions and were guided in mak-
ing them by situational awareness, as well as by knowledge of both the con-
flict-specific and general (or “standing”) rules of engagement (ROEs) that con-
strain and inform such activities. The key similarity is that full autonomy to act 
without external restraint was seldom granted to the human commanders. That 
is to say, despite the human commanders possessing a wide range of complex 
and varying capacities—intuitive judgment, leadership, moral scruples, con-
science—that would be extremely difficult to replicate in machine behavior, the 
humans in fact usually simply acted in accordance with these Standing Orders. 
Generally, humans acted within a regulatory and governance framework rang-
 
 13.  See Noel Sharkey, Saying ‘No!’ to Lethal Autonomous Targeting, 9 J. MILITARY 
ETHICS 369 (2010). For an account of the work of ICRAC, see Nic Fleming, Campaign Asks 
for International Treaty to Limit War Robots, NEW SCIENTIST, (Sept. 30, 2009 3:41 PM), 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn17887-campaign-asks-for-international-treaty-to-
limit-war-robots.html. See also Berlin Statement, INT’L COMMITTEE FOR ROBOT ARMS 
CONTROL, http://icrac.net/statements (last visited Jan. 8, 2014); Mission Statement, INT’L 
COMMITTEE FOR ROBOT ARMS CONTROL, http://icrac.net/who/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
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ing over a set of considerations, from the international law of the sea, to hu-
manitarian law and a range of treaty obligations, all the way to specific rules of 
engagement designed to remove as much ambiguity and personal responsibility 
or accountability as possible from their actions (even if that is not exactly how 
they saw it, thought about it, or would have described it at the time). The hu-
man commanders had some situational autonomy, but not full (let alone unlim-
ited) autonomy. Hence, their behaviors might be far easier to simulate with un-
manned systems in the underwater military environment. Here, in this more 
clearly defined arena (as opposed to a range of other, more complex environ-
ments) we might hope at least to develop unmanned, semi-autonomous systems 
that could function at a level of reliability and safety equivalent to humans, 
even absent the advances in programming and governance technology that 
would otherwise be required to literally duplicate or replace the human pres-
ence or involvement in these scenarios. 
If this vastly less presumptuous and far more attainable objective seems 
feasible in the case of underwater systems, might we then return to the even 
more complex land-based scenario of the brigade combat team engaged in a 
recon mission searching for insurgents in a nearby village? Like the underwater 
ISR mission, this scenario is for the most part “dull, dirty, and dangerous,” as 
well as tedious and unrewarding, and on those grounds alone it is in principle 
amenable to the use of unmanned systems. The dull, dirty, and boring aspects 
cease, however, whenever something dramatic and unexpected occurs, like a 
small child bursting out of a house and running in fear across the path of an en-
emy insurgent who is about to fire his rifle or escape. Could an unmanned 
ground system conceivably cope with that foreseeable but unexpected circum-
stance, and others like it, with the degree of flexibility and sound judgment we 
demand of human combatants? Specifically, could it reliably and safely recog-
nize the child as a noncombatant, and appropriately withhold fire (even if the 
legitimate target is thereby allowed to fire freely or escape capture)? 
In the underwater case, we compared the degree of autonomy and sophisti-
cation required for the unmanned system to duplicate, not the full capacities of 
the human commander, but what we might term the capacities specifically au-
thorized for use by that commander (which are considerably less than the full 
range available in the human case). Likewise, in the village scenario, we would 
compare the capacities required of a functioning and semi-autonomous ground 
system to those required and expected of, say, a young army private, recently 
recruited, trained, oriented to the ROEs applicable, and deployed in this conflict 
zone. Do we have a reasonable prospect of designing an unmanned ground sys-
tem to function as well as, say, a relatively new army private? More generally, 
is there a reasonable prospect for designing and integrating unmanned ground 
systems into the “force mix” of brigade combat teams in order to work reliably 
alongside, or even replace, some of the army privates (if not the sergeant or 
lieutenant)?  
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There are many more instances, as well as variations of these types of un-
expected encounters or unforeseen developments in the land-based case than in 
the underwater environment. The robot has some surprising advantages over 
the army private when it comes to its potential reaction time, especially with 
respect to the risk of harm it can tolerate in comparison to the human combat-
ant. Where the unmanned system presently lags far behind the army private—
and why the deployment of safe and reliable land-based systems may require a 
much longer period of development—is in what I described in the underwater 
instance as its degree of “situational awareness.” Automatic target recognition 
or pattern recognition software employed in the unmanned system needs to be 
able interact quickly and reliably with hardware sensors to enable the system to 
distinguish between a child and an adult, between an insurgent and a shepherd, 
and between an AK-47 and a child’s toy or a shepherd’s crook. While this can 
in fact be done at present, such distinctions cannot yet be made at a fast opera-
tional pace with anything like the reliability of the army private, even when al-
lowing for the occasional errors in the latter’s situational awareness amid the 
“fog of war.”  
But what if one day soon such systems could reliably and consistently 
demonstrate the requisite degree of situational awareness? Or what if, in the 
meantime, we chose to develop and deploy land-based systems only in combat 
environments that resembled the very clearly structured underwater environ-
ment—i.e., characterized by very precise boundary conditions with little likeli-
hood of the anomalous events and concomitant mistakes of judgment or per-
ception that lead in turn to tragedy? The development of fully effective and 
reliable target and pattern recognition software and “friend or foe” systems may 
well lie in the reasonably near-term, foreseeable future. And meanwhile, robots 
have, in fact, been deployed in highly scripted contexts, such as serving as sen-
tries and border guards in prohibited demilitarized or “no-go” zones. Robot sen-
tries are currently used effectively in Israel as border guards in remote, strictly 
“entry-forbidden” areas, as well as by South Korea in the demilitarized zone 
with the North.14 While primarily used for ISR at sea, the U.S. Navy is consid-
ering a plan to arm and deploy smaller versions of its “Fire Scouts”—
unmanned and semi-autonomous helicopters—to provide force protection to 
ship convoys or aircraft carriers to shield them from insurgent attacks when ap-
proaching ports-of-call.15 The development and increased use of unmanned 
systems in such environments could well lead to effective and relatively low-
cost force multiplication with lower risk for combatants and noncombatants 
 
 14.  South Korea Deploys Robot Capable of Killing Intruders along Border with North, 
THE TELEGRAPH (July 13, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/ 
southkorea/7887217/South-Korea-deploys-robot-capable-of-killing-intruders-along-border-
with-North.html. 
 15.  Christopher P. Cavas, U.S. Navy’s New, Bigger Fire Scout to Fly this Fall, 
DEFENSE NEWS (June 11, 2013 3:45 AM), http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130611/ 
DEFREG02/306110009. 
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alike. If we can do these things, and if doing so works as well or better than our 
current practice, then perhaps we should pursue more fully our capabilities to 
do so. Moreover, if we determine that we can and should make these modifica-
tions, and if it is feasible to do so, ought we not to be trying as hard as we can 
to bring about these marked improvements in the conduct of armed conflict? 
III. UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This last line of reasoning describes another dimension of the Arkin Test: 
an unmanned platform fulfills the demands of law and morality (and may there-
fore be permissibly deployed) when it can be shown to comply with legal and 
moral requirements or constraints as well or better than a human under similar 
circumstances. Computer scientist Ronald C. Arkin, to whom we owe the 
benchmark, observes that this principle may also serve to generate a technolog-
ical obligation to move forward with the development and use of robotic tech-
nology that would render war itself, and the conduct of armed hostilities, less 
destructive, risky, and indiscriminate.16 The prospects for increasingly auto-
mated warfare turn critically on this moral claim.  
Satisfying the Arkin Test, however, requires that we identify, analyze, and 
replicate the range of requisite behaviors in question sufficiently well enough to 
generate a reliable program script for an unmanned system that will emulate or 
duplicate the kind of human judgment and action called for in a given situation. 
In the underwater case, we can foresee, for example, that a human commander 
might be tempted to override the ROE prohibition against venturing into the 
international marine preserve because he or she “notices” something that our 
comparatively limited and literal-minded UUV would miss. But of course, the 
human commander might also override ROEs out of pride, ego, ambition, or 
just plain poor judgment. Likewise, in the village, the army private might exer-
cise what partisans of folk psychology would label “intuitive judgment” in or-
der to spare innocent lives, but might equally well instead react in just the op-
posite fashion—motivated perhaps by confusion and fear, racism, hatred, 
resentment, or mental disturbance—leading to an excessive and indiscriminate 
use of force resulting in the tragic injury or death of noncombatants.  
While on the one hand we probably cannot analyze the intuition and situa-
tional awareness of the human into simplified Boolean logic, we have the com-
pensating reassurance on the other hand that unmanned systems could not con-
ceivably emulate any of the other undesirable human reactions described 
above. This is simply because UUVs or UGVs do not care, they have no inter-
ests, intentions, or self-regard, they harbor no ambitions or hatred, and they are 
utterly incapable of the “interiority” (to use another metaphor of folk psycholo-
 
 16.  Ronald C. Arkin, The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems, 9 J. MIL. 
ETHICS 332, 347-56 (2010); see also RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN 
AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS (2009) (setting forth Arkin’s definitive perspective on the topic). 
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gy) characteristic of self-consciousness. The German philosopher Martin 
Heidegger famously maintained that “Care [Sorge] is the Being of Dasein,” a 
complex manner of depicting that such “interior” features—concern and com-
passion, as well as hatred and ambition, self-deception and self-regard—
constitute the essence of being human.17  
Heidegger’s insight pertains especially well to the elusive folk term “con-
science,” that seems to integrate several of the components I have mentioned 
specifically, alongside others. I care about others than just myself, I have at-
tachments of friendship, love and loyalty, and I sense that there are bonds and 
expectations connected to these that generate a range of duties and obligations 
to act in certain ways and avoid others. And, when tempted to override those 
constraints for the sake of immediate mission accomplishment (alternatively 
described more straightforwardly and less euphemistically as self interest, ex-
pediency, or personal gain), my acknowledgement of these other concerns 
causes cognitive dissonance, resulting in uncertainty about how to proceed. Be-
cause I “care” about these other matters and persons, I feel guilt, which may 
intervene to impede my attempts to override those concerns for the sake of ex-
pediency—or, failing to do so, the resulting “guilt” may function as a kind of 
biofeedback to improve my behavior in the future. This is quintessentially hu-
man. Our own, human caring is one (perhaps highly effective) manner of be-
havioral governance, in both an individual and social sense. We might just as 
well say that this trait of “caring,” along with the constellation of intentional 
and emotional states surrounding it, constitutes the unique software package 
with which we have come from the factory pre-loaded, and that this particular 
software package works with our particular hardware effectively in most cases 
to generate responsible, intentional, accountable individual behavior within a 
wider social or cultural context. And whether we might additionally speculate 
that God, or evolution, or both, or something else entirely has conspired to de-
sign this arrangement, regardless it still remains functionally the case that emo-
tions like guilt and concomitant phenomenal experiences like “conscience” 
function as behavioral modifiers. They are part of an elaborate and complex 
human feedback system that serves to modulate, constrain, and modify our in-
dividual behavior in a social context. 
One strategy in robotics that takes account of the foregoing observations is, 
accordingly, to pursue the path of “strong artificial intelligence,” in which hu-
man engineers and computer scientists seek to develop computational models 
 
 17.  This famous line occurs in Chapter Six of Heidegger’s great early work, MARTIN 
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 225 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., Harper & 
Row 1962) (1929). This is likely not the proper venue for entering into an extensive analysis 
of what this may portend for human existence, save to say that all the subtle forms of experi-
ence Heidegger describes in his own, Husserlian-like account of time-consciousness in the 
human case clearly are not part of the “experience” of machines, including robots. Indeed, 
one account of the essence of such artifacts is that they don’t have “experiences.” And inso-
far as these experiences are (as both Heidegger and his teacher Edmund Husserl aver) consti-
tutive of human being, robots are not at all like, nor likely to be like, human beings. 
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of human moral behavior by attempting to replicate emotions like guilt, as part 
of a larger effort to develop a fully functioning machine analogue of human 
moral conscience. This highly ambitious strategy might entail trying to repli-
cate other features of the complex pallet of human mental states or human tac-
tics associated with the “phenomenon” of morality (and immorality), such as 
ambition, self-regard, or the ability to engage in deceptive and misleading be-
havior.18 The ambitious agenda of “strong AI” has been advocated by a number 
of scientists and engineers, from Marvin Minsky19 to Arkin himself, as the 
most promising avenue to designing machine morality.20 As an ambitious, 
long-range research project, such initiatives have much to commend them. It 
would be fascinating to analyze “guilt” as an effective form of system feedback 
and behavioral modification and self-correction or “machine learning.” Like-
wise, it seems clear that some machine analogue of deceptive behavior might 
sometimes prove necessary in a robotic system designed for sophisticated bat-
tlefield extraction, or perhaps elder care (guiding the machine’s actions toward 
reducing fear, bewilderment, and shock in the treatment of battlefield casualties 
or in the care of dementia patients). Do we need to reproduce exactly, or even 
approximately, these identical capacities in unmanned systems in order to make 
them reliable and safe and effective? From the previous (albeit simplified) sce-
narios, it would appear not.  
Robots are not, nor could they be, nor would we need or wish to them to 
be, “human” in this sense. In contrast to Arkin’s stated research agenda in par-
ticular, such ambitions do not seem to constitute a logically necessary prelimi-
nary step toward guaranteeing safety, reliability, and the most basic compliance 
on the part of present-day unmanned systems with prevailing legal and moral 
 
 18.  Deception is a fascinating case in point, in that behavioral scientists have known 
for decades that deception is not unique to humans. It occurs in a variety of species, and is 
utilized as a tactic in pursuit of a variety of ends, from simple survival to the fulfilling of de-
sires and ambitions (whether for food, sex, power, or to elicit the affection of others). Daniel 
Dennet, an eminent cognitive scientist and philosopher of the mind, is perhaps best known 
for his accounts over the years of the role of deception as an important dimension of inten-
tionality in animal and human behavior. See, e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTERNATIONAL 
STANCE (1987). In the human case, deception is a powerful tactic to operationalize strategies 
with a variety of objectives that might be defined as “successful mission outcome.” For ex-
ample calming a terrified wounded combatant with reassuring words so that he may be 
brought back from the front to a military hospital for treatment, or, in quite a different sense 
building some sort of “Potemkin Village” (such as General George Patton’s “First United 
States Army Group” (FUSAG) during World War II) so that the enemy might be deceived 
regarding troop strength, placement, or tactical intentions.  
 19.  MARVIN MINSKY, THE EMOTION MACHINE: COMMONSENSE THINKING ABOUT 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE HUMAN MIND (2006). 
 20.  Ronald C. Arkin & Patrick Ulam, An Ethical Adaptor: Behavioral Modification 
Derived from Moral Emotions, in IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE IN ROBOTICS AND AUTOMATION 381 (2009); Ronald C. Arkin, Patrick Ulam & 
Alan R. Wagner, Moral Decision Making in Autonomous Systems: Enforcement, Moral 
Emotions, Dignity, Trust, and Deception, 100 PROC. IEEE 571 (2012). 
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norms of behavior in combat or security operations.21 Once again, as the fore-
going scenarios demonstrate, satisfactory results can be obtained employing ex-
isting software, hardware, and programming languages. Those modest success-
es in relatively uncomplicated situations might well lead researchers and end 
users toward further, fully feasible, and largely conventional engineering solu-
tions to the more complex behavioral challenges in unmanned systems govern-
ance.  
We might usefully compare this alternative research agenda with the histo-
ry of aviation, in which initially ambitious and largely unsuccessful attempts to 
model animal behavior directly gave way to more modest and ultimately suc-
cessful attempts to attain flight through the use of conventional materials and 
system designs that bore little resemblance to the actual behavior of birds or 
insects. Indeed, it is only within the past few years that engineering and materi-
al sciences (including miniaturization of powerful computing) have enabled 
engineers to actually model and duplicate the flight behaviors of birds and in-
sects directly. Had we, however, demanded adherence to this strict narrow-
minded correspondence of principle at the dawn of the aviation age (rather than 
rightly abandoning it at the time as unattainable), we would likely still be 
awaiting our first successful flight, and, through this lack of creative imagina-
tion, have missed out on an entire intervening century of exciting aviation de-
velopments, uses, and benefits that bear only the most rudimentary resemblance 
to animal behavior. 
IV. MORAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF A LESS COMPLEX RESEARCH 
AGENDA 
The foregoing observations and insights are essential to addressing the host 
of controversies that have otherwise arisen in the field of military robotics in 
particular. Indeed, from the emergence and increasing use of unmanned or “re-
motely piloted” vehicles to the advent of cyber war and conflict, the develop-
ment of new and exotic military technologies has provoked fierce and divisive 
public debate regarding the ethical challenges posed by such technologies. Pe-
ter Singer and Noel Sharkey, in particular, have focused their criticisms espe-
cially upon Ronald Arkin, whom they accuse of offering false and technologi-
cally unattainable promises as justification for his advocacy of greater use of 
military robots in combat.  
Their argument is, in effect, in line with the foregoing observation regard-
ing uniquely human capacities, traits, and behaviors that seem constitutive of 
 
 21.  This observation is not meant to gainsay either the significance or utility of such 
research. Rather, I merely mean to indicate that Arkin’s research agenda does not represent 
the only way forward on the question of “robot morality.” His is an example of what one 
might term a “visionary” approach, as opposed, frankly, to a more pedestrian (or “workman-
like”) approach making use of available technological capacity in the present to address the 
pressing questions of law and ethics with respect to unmanned systems.  
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moral reasoning and effective moral judgment and decisionmaking. The com-
putational machine analogues of these human behaviors and mental states have 
not yet been attained, and will not likely be so in the near future, if ever. In-
deed, both Singer and Sharkey think the promises of “strong” artificial intelli-
gence researchers in these areas, in particular, are hyperbole and pure science 
fiction.22 As a result, they claim there is no warrant for continuing to develop 
autonomous, lethally armed military hardware, and that it is deceptive and cyn-
ical to offer such vague promises as grounds for continuing to support and fund 
such research. A machine without these requisite guidance systems, lethally 
armed, and otherwise autonomous (self-guided, independent of ongoing human 
executive oversight, and capable of making and executing “kill-chain” targeting 
decisions unilaterally) would invariably prove dangerously unreliable, and the 
very pursuit of such research is reckless, if not criminally negligent.23 Sharkey 
and Singer go so far as to claim, as a result, that attempts to design such sys-
tems, let alone deploy them, should be outlawed altogether. As mentioned in 
passing above, Wendell Wallach has proposed a somewhat different strategy 
that would designate the use of such systems wholly apart from any form of 
human supervision, executive oversight, or accountability as off limits. In this 
way of thinking, if the use of wholly unsupervised autonomous systems is 
thought to be inappropriate, Wallach argues, one could place a legal limit on 
the use of lethally armed versions of unmanned systems by having them desig-
nated mala in se under international law. This legal designation would have the 
effect of grouping the use of lethally armed autonomous systems alongside the 
use of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, as serving no le-
gitimate military purpose whatever. Armed unmanned systems could circum-
vent this legal restriction only if they remained fully under human control, with 
accountability for targeting decisions (including errors and any resulting collat-
eral damage) ascribed solely to human agents. Apart from the sensitive legal 
terminology entailed in this proposal, it would otherwise have consequences 
largely indistinguishable from the current ban on the development and use of 
unsupervised lethally armed autonomous systems established in the Department 
of Defense directive of November 2012. The designation would have the addi-
tional effect of making the current ban permanent rather than temporary.24 
 
 22.  Noel Sharkey, The Automation and Proliferation of Military Drones and the Pro-
tection of Civilians, 3 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 236 (2011); Noel Sharkey, March of the Kill-
er Robots, LONDON TELEGRAPH (June 15, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/ 
science-news/5543603/March-of-the-killer-robots.html. 
 23.  See SINGER, supra note 3 (commenting on the bad faith and deceptive nature of 
moral reassurances from engineers like Arkin who are engaged in promoting the values and 
virtues of autonomous systems); see also Peter W. Singer, The Ethics of Killer Apps: Why Is 
it So Hard to talk about Morality When It Comes to New Military Technology? 9 J. MIL. 
ETHICS 299 (2010).  
 24.  Wallach, supra note 12. The legal sensitivity stems from the association of lethally 
armed autonomous systems with other means and methods of warfare that are “evil in them-
selves” (mala in se), such as rape. It is less clear or convincing, however, that the reasons 
  
2014] AUTOMATED WARFARE 331 
Such ongoing and intractable controversies may point toward an altogether 
different problem. These intractable moral dilemmas, ironically, may be taken 
as evidence that the language of morality and ethics is serving us poorly in this 
context, further confusing, rather than helpfully clarifying or enlightening us on 
how best to cope with the continuing development and deployment of seeming-
ly exotic new military technologies. To the complaint of opponents of military 
uses of robotics that such uses are immoral and are, or ought to be, declared il-
legal, proponents respond by attempting to promise, at least, that their creations 
“will be able to behave as or more ethically than humans.” In fact, however, 
opposing parties involved in these discussions harbor distinctive and incompat-
ible—and sometimes conceptually confused and unclear—notions of what 
“ethics” entails. From individual and culturally determined intuitions regarding 
right conduct through the achievement of beneficial outcomes all the way to 
equating ethics merely with legal compliance, this conceptual confusion results 
in frequent and virtually hopeless equivocation. Moreover, many scientists and 
engineers (not to mention military personnel) tend to view the wider public’s 
concern with “ethics” as misplaced, and regard the invocation of “ethics” in 
these contexts as little more than a pretext for technologically and scientifically 
illiterate, fear-mongering, nay-saying luddites who simply wish to impede the 
progress of science and technology. 
But why should we insist on invoking fear and mistrust, and posing alleg-
edly “moral” objections to the development and use of unmanned systems, in-
stead of defining clear engineering design specifications and operational out-
comes that incorporate the main ethical concerns? Why not simply require that 
engineers and the military either design, build, and operate their unmanned sys-
tems to these exacting standards, if they are able, or else desist from manufac-
turing or deploying such systems until they succeed in satisfying these engi-
neering specifications? Why engage in a science-fiction debate over the future 
prospects for artificial machine intelligence that would incorporate analogues 
of human moral cognition, when (as I have demonstrated above in the case of 
UUVs) what is required is far more feasible and less exotic: namely, machines 
that function reliably, safely, and fully in compliance with applicable interna-
tional laws—such as the law of armed conflict (LOAC), when operating in 
wartime? And why insist that the development and use of such systems would 
constitute a “game changer” that ushers in a new mode of unrestricted warfare, 
 
adduced for this classification would prove compelling, both because the analogy between 
autonomous systems and other familiar examples of means mala in se (rape, in particular) do 
not appear obvious, while the author’s argument still seems to rest in part on the objection I 
have tried in this Article to discredit: namely, that machines cannot be held accountable for 
their actions. Biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, in addition, are not so 
designed on account of the design or type of the weapon itself, but because the use of such 
weapons is thought to cause unnecessary injury and superfluous suffering. It is hard to see 
how this could possibly be the case with lethally armed, autonomous “drones,” where the 
death or injury from a missile is presumably identical to that experienced from the same mis-
sile fired from a manned aircraft.  
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in which all the known laws and moral principles of armed conflict are ren-
dered obsolete, when what is required is merely appropriate analogical reason-
ing to determine how the known constraints on conventional armed conflict 
might be usefully extrapolated to provide effective governance for these novel 
conditions?  
The prospects for machine models of moral cognition, as we have discov-
ered to this point, constitute a fascinating but as yet futuristic and highly specu-
lative enterprise. The goal of developing working computational models of rea-
soning, including moral reasoning, may not prove altogether impossible, but 
the effort required will surely be formidable. “Morality” and moral deliberation 
for the present (as critics of military robotics contend) remain firmly in the do-
main of human experience, and likely will remain there for the foreseeable fu-
ture. In any event, discussions of ethics and morality pertaining to unmanned 
systems at present are largely irrelevant. We neither want nor need our un-
manned systems to “be ethical,” let alone “more ethical” or “more humane” 
than human agents. We merely need them to be safe and reliable, to fulfill their 
programmable purposes without error or accident, and to have that program-
ming designed to conform to relevant international law (LOAC) and specific 
rules of engagement (ROEs). With regard to legal compliance, that is to say, 
machines should be able to pass the Arkin Test: autonomous unmanned sys-
tems must be demonstrably capable of meeting or exceeding behavioral 
benchmarks set by human agents performing similar tasks under similar cir-
cumstances, as we have thus far shown them quite capable in the case of 
UUVs. 
On the other hand, proposals at this juncture simply to “outlaw” research, 
development, design, and manufacture of autonomous weapons systems seem 
at once premature, ill-timed, ill-informed—classic examples of “poor govern-
ance.” Such proposals do not reflect the concerns of the majority of stakehold-
ers who would be affected; they misstate, and would attempt to over-regulate 
relevant behaviors.25 Ultimately, such regulatory statutes would prove unac-
ceptable to and unenforceable against many of the relevant parties (especially 
among nations or organizations with little current regard for international law), 
 
 25.  In addition to proposals to outlaw armed or autonomous military robotic systems 
by ICRAC itself. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST 
KILLER ROBOTS (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
arms1112ForUpload_0.pdf. While unquestionably well-intentioned, the report is often poor-
ly or incompletely informed regarding technical details, and highly misleading in many of its 
observations. Furthermore, its proposal for states to collaborate in banning the further devel-
opment and use of such technologies would not only prove unenforceable, but likely would 
impede other kinds of developments in robotics (such as the use of autonomous systems dur-
ing natural disasters and humanitarian crises) that the authors themselves would not mean to 
prohibit. It is in such senses that these sorts of proposals represent “poor governance.” For a 
well-informed and clearly argued rejoinder to this report, critiquing the legal efforts to ban 
autonomous systems, see KENNETH ANDERSON & MATTHEW WAXMAN, LAW AND ETHICS FOR 
AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: WHY A BAN WON’T WORK, AND WHY THE LAWS OF WAR 
CAN (2013). 
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and would thus serve merely to undermine respect for the rule of law in interna-
tional relations. Machines themselves (lacking the requisite features of folk 
psychology, such as beliefs, intentions, and desires) by definition cannot them-
selves commit war crimes, nor could a machine itself be held meaningfully ac-
countable for its actions under the law. Instead, a regulatory and criminal re-
gime, respecting relative legal jurisdictions, already exists that holds human in-
individuals and organizations who might engage in reckless and/or criminally 
negligent behavior in the design, manufacture, and end use of unmanned sys-
tems of any sort fully accountable for their behavior and its consequences. 
V. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR UNMANNED SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND 
DEPLOYMENT POLICY 
Rather than engaging in a headstrong and ill-informed rush to proposing 
unenforceable treaties or legislating more ineffectual “bright line” statutes of 
black-letter international law, the proper course of action would instead be to 
invite those engaged in the development and use of such technologies, in the 
course of their activities, to reflect upon and observe what appear to them to be 
the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable conduct, and to codify these by 
consensus and agreement as the principles of what would be termed “best prac-
tices” in their fields. Indeed, what international relations and policy experts 
sometimes term “emergent norms” regarding ethics, legal jurisdiction, compli-
ance, and appropriate degrees of consent and accountability for all the stake-
holders already have been implicitly established. What is urgently needed at 
this juncture is a clear summary of the results of these ongoing discussions and 
debates that would, in turn, help to codify what we seem to have proposed or 
agreed upon in these matters, and what requires still further deliberation and 
attention.  
In the case of the debate over autonomous systems, the unrecognized and 
neglected areas of mutual consensus during the past several years of conten-
tious debate regarding unmanned systems and automated warfare may be use-
fully summarized in the following Precepts, which define good or best practic-
es, and delineate the limits of acceptable versus unacceptable practice. The 
point of the exercise is not to presume or preempt proper legislative authority, 
but instead to focus future discussions upon whether such Precepts are correctly 
stated (and if not, to modify them accordingly), examine the degree to which 
these areas of presumed consensus are in fact widely held, and, finally, to iden-
tify areas of omission that must still be addressed. In that spirit, I offer these 
Precepts as a working summary to date of the emerging consensus on the use of 
autonomous weapons systems, and propose that a summit of practitioners and 
international stakeholders (in a procedure analogous to the Asilomar Conven-
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tion on Genetic Research, or the Pugwash Conventions on Nuclear Arms)26 be 
convened at the earliest possible date to continue to revise, amend, and agree to 
abide by these precepts governing the development and use of unmanned sys-
tems. 
I. The Principle of Mission Legality 
A military mission that has been deemed legally permissible and morally 
justifiable on all other relevant grounds does not lose this status solely on the 
basis of a modification or change in the technological means used to carry it out 
(i.e., by removing the pilot from the cockpit of the airframe, or replacing a 
submarine crew and commander with demonstrably reliable software), unless 
the technology in question represents or employs weapons or methods already 
specifically proscribed under existing international Weapons Conventions or 
that are in violation of the prohibitions in international humanitarian law 
against means or methods that inflict superfluous injury or unnecessary suffer-
ing (or the technology is otherwise judged to constitute means of warfighting 
that are mala in se). 
II. The Principle of Unnecessary Risk27 
Within the context of an otherwise lawful and morally justified internation-
al armed conflict or domestic security operation, we owe the combatant or do-
mestic security agent every possible minimization of risk we can provide them 
in the course of carrying out their otherwise legally permissible and morally 
justifiable missions. We owe third parties and bystanders (civilian noncombat-
ants) caught up in the conflict every protection we can afford them through the 
use of ever-improved means of conflict that lessen the chance of inadvertent 
injury, death, or damage to their property and means of livelihood. 
[Comment: This precept combines the original insight of Strawer’s princi-
ple of unnecessary risk, with Arkin’s sense that military technologists should 
 
 26.  A landmark conference on recombinant DNA research organized by geneticist 
Paul Berg at Asilomar, California in 1975 resulting in a moratorium on genetics research that 
might inadvertently generate serious harm in the absence of a full scientific understanding of 
the risks involved in such research. Earlier, nuclear scientists who desired to play a strong 
role in the policy implications of the proliferation and possible use of nuclear weapons of 
mass destruction in the 1950s and 1960s organized a series of working conferences, begin-
ning at a site in the small town of Pugwash, Nova Scotia (Canada) to promote international 
efforts to limit the prospects of all-out nuclear war. Philosophy Professor Don Howard, Di-
rector of the Reilly Center for Science, Technology and Values at Notre Dame University, 
has proposed something like this process as an approach to ameliorating cyber conflict. I 
agree, and think it even more appropriate to the current status of the debate over ethics, law, 
and unmanned systems. 
 27.  First formulated by Bradley J. Strawser. See Bradley J. Strawser, Moral Predators: 
the Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 342 (2010).  
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feel obliged to exercise their expertise to lessen the cruel and anti-humanitarian 
aspects of armed conflict.] 
III. The Principle of the Moral Asymmetry of Adversaries 
No obligation of “fairness” or symmetry of technological advantage is 
owed to opponents or adversaries whenever the latter are unmistakably engaged 
in unjust or illegal use of force, whether during the commission of domestic 
crimes, or when involved in international criminal conspiracies (terrorism). 
[Comment: It is sometimes mistakenly asserted that in international war 
and armed conflict, at least, there is some such obligation, and hence that one 
moral objection to the use of unmanned systems is that “the other side doesn’t 
have them.” Technological asymmetry is not a new phenomenon, however, but 
rather an enduring feature of armed conflict. No such constraint is imposed on 
domestic law enforcement engaged in armed conflict with, for example, inter-
national drug cartels. Likewise, no such obligation of symmetry is owed to in-
ternational adversaries when they are engaged in similar criminal activities: 
e.g., violation of domestic legal statutes within the borders of a sovereign state, 
defiance of duly elected legal authorities, indiscriminate targeting of civilians 
and destruction of property, kidnapping, torture, execution, mutilation of pris-
oners, etc.]28 
IV. The Principle of Greatest Proportional Compliance 
In the pursuit of a legally permissible and morally justifiable military (or 
security) mission, agents are obligated to use the means or methods available 
that promise the closest compliance with the international laws of armed con-
flict (LOAC) and applicable rules of engagement (ROEs), such as non-
combatant distinction (discrimination) and the economy of force (proportionali-
ty). 
[Comment: This is another implication of Arkin’s assertion of an obligation 
to use unmanned systems whenever they might result in greater compliance 
with international law, and in the lessening of human suffering in war. In this 
 
 28.  Note that this is not an explicit rejection of the doctrine of the “Moral Equality of 
Combatants,” an essential element in what Michael Walzer defines as the “War Conven-
tion.” MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 44 (2d ed. 1977). Rather, it is a repudiation 
of a misplaced notion of “fairness in combat,” according to which it would be unfair for one 
side in a conflict to possess or use weapons or military technologies that afforded them un-
due advantage. This is sometimes cited in public as an objection to the use of “drones” in 
warfare. It seems to equate war with a sporting competition, after medieval jousting fashion, 
and, upon examination, is not only patently ridiculous, but contradicted in most actual armed 
conflicts of the past, where maneuvering for “technological superiority” was a key element 
in success. In any case, no such argument is made concerning legitimate domestic security 
operations, as noted above, and does not obtain either within the realm of wars of “law en-
forcement” or humanitarian intervention. 
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case, the implication is that nations involved in armed conflict must use the 
least destructive means available (whether these be robots, cyber weapons, pre-
cision-guided munitions, or “non-lethal” weapons) in pursuit of military objec-
tives that are otherwise deemed to be morally justified and legally permissible.] 
V. The Arkin Test 
In keeping with Precept IV, an artifact (such as an autonomous unmanned 
system) satisfies the requirements of international law and morality pertaining 
to armed conflict or law enforcement, and may therefore be lawfully used 
alongside, or substituted for, human agents whenever the artifact can be shown 
to comply with the relevant laws and ROEs as (or even more) reliably and con-
sistently as human agents under similar circumstances.  
[Comment: Moreover, from application of Precepts II and IV above, the 
use of such an artifact is not merely legally permissible, but morally required, 
whenever its performance promises both reduced risk to human agents and en-
hanced compliance with LOAC and ROEs.] 
VI. The Principle of Non-Delegation of Authority and Accountability 
The decision to attack an enemy (whether combatants or other targets) with 
lethal force may not be delegated solely to an unmanned system in the absence 
of human oversight, nor may eventual accountability for carrying out such an 
attack be wholly abrogated by human operators otherwise normally included in 
the “kill chain.” 
[Comment: This Precept is indebted to the work of philosopher Robert Asa-
ro of the New School (New York), co-founder of the International Committee 
for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC). It also brings professional canons of best 
practice in line with the requirements of the U.S. Department of Defense guid-
ance on future unmanned systems, stating that autonomous unmanned systems 
shall not be authorized to make unilateral, unsupervised targeting decisions.]29 
VII. The Principle of Due Care 
All research and development, design, and manufacture of artifacts (such 
as lethally armed and/or autonomous unmanned systems) ultimately intended 
for use alongside or in place of human agents engaged in legally permissible 
and morally justifiable armed conflict or domestic security operations must rig-
orously comply with Precepts I-V, above. All Research & Development 
(R&D), design, and manufacture of unmanned systems undertaken with full 
knowledge of, and in good faith compliance with, the above Precepts (such 
good faith at minimum to encompass rigorous testing to ensure safe and relia-
 
 29.  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 7.  
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ble operation under the terms of these precepts) shall be understood as legally 
permissible and morally justifiable. 
VIII. The Principle of Product Liability 
Mistakes, errors, or malfunctions that nonetheless might reasonably and 
randomly be expected to occur, despite the full and good faith exercise of due 
care as defined in Precept VII above, shall be accountable under applicable in-
ternational and/or domestic product liability law, including full and fair finan-
cial and other compensation or restitution for wrongful injury, death, or de-
struction of property. 
[Comment: this practice mirrors current international norms as practiced by 
minimally rights-respecting States in the case of conventional armed conflict. 
When combatants accidentally or unintentionally bring about the injury or 
death of non-combatants, the responsible state acknowledges blame and offers 
apology and financial restitution to the victims or to their survivors in the af-
termath of an investigation into the wrongful death or injury, which is under-
taken to determine any additional criminal liability.] 
IX. The Principle of Criminal Negligence 
By contrast, R&D, design, or manufacture of systems undertaken through 
culpable ignorance, or in deliberate or willful disregard of these precepts (to 
include failure to perform, or attempts to falsify the results of, tests regarding 
safety, reliability of operation, and compliance with applicable law and ROEs, 
especially in the aftermath of malfunctions as noted above), shall be subject to 
designation as “war crimes” under international law, and/or as reckless endan-
germent or criminally negligent behavior under the terms of applicable interna-
tional and/or domestic law. Individual parties to such negligence shall be pun-
ished to the full extent of the law, to include trial and conviction in the 
International Criminal Court for the willful commission of war crimes, and/or 
civil and criminal prosecution within the appropriate domestic jurisdiction for 
reckless endangerment or criminal negligence. In domestic jurisdictions provid-
ing for capital punishment upon conviction for the occurrence of such mishaps 
within that jurisdiction, such punishment shall be deemed an appropriate form 
of accountability under the Precepts above. 
[Comment: This Precept incorporates the concerns, and addresses the ob-
jectives of critics of military robotics pertaining to wrongful injury, death, or 
destruction of property by unmanned systems in which a human combatant, 
under similar conditions, could and would be held criminally liable for the 
commission of war crimes. The precept allows imposition of the death penalty 
for such offenses when guilt is ascertained within legal jurisdictions permitting 
capital punishment.] 
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X. Benchmarking 
Testing for safety and reliability of operation under the relevant precepts 
above shall require advance determination of relevant quantitative benchmarks 
for human performance under the conditions of anticipated use, and shall re-
quire any artifact produced or manufactured to meet or exceed these bench-
marks. 
[Comment: This operationalizes the otherwise vague concept of “the be-
havior of human beings under similar circumstances,” requiring that this be as-
certained and sufficiently well-defined to guide the evaluation and assessment 
of the requisite performance of unmanned systems proposed for use in armed 
conflict.] 
XI. Orientation and Legal Compliance 
All individuals and organizations (including military services, industries, 
and research laboratories) engaged in R&D, design, manufacture, acquisition, 
or use of unmanned systems for military purposes shall be required to attend an 
orientation and legal compliance seminar of not less than eight hours on these 
Precepts, and upon conclusion, to receive, sign, and duly file with appropriate 
authorities a signed copy of these Precepts as a precondition of their continued 
work. Failure to comply shall render such individuals liable under the principle 
of criminal liability (Precept IX) above for any phase of their work, including, 
but not limited to, accidents or malfunctions resulting in injury, death, or de-
struction of property.  
Government and military agencies involved in contracting for the design 
and acquisition of such systems shall likewise require and sponsor this orienta-
tion seminar and facilitate the deposit of the required signed precept form by 
any contractors or contracting organizations receiving federal financial support 
for their activities. Federal acquisitions and procurement officials shall also re-
ceive this training, and shall be obligated to include the relevant safe-
ty/reliability benchmarks of human performance along with other technical de-
sign specifications established in RFPs or federal contracts. 
[Comment: One frequently raised objection to the concept of “soft law” and 
governance according to emergent norms questions the degree of sanction and 
normativity attached to the enforcement of these norms. Inasmuch as the Pre-
cepts themselves define a region of criminal behavior, and establish the bounds 
of jurisdiction pertaining to criminal activity in these cases, this final Precept 
ensures that affected stakeholders deemed to be bound by these Precepts are 
fully cognizant of their content, interpretation, and prospective normative 
force.] 
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CONCLUSION 
Law and moral discourse, famously, always lag behind technological inno-
vations (especially, if not exclusively, in warfare) and their transformative im-
pact on the cultures in which they arise. That does not mean that law and moral-
ity are irrelevant and must be cast aside, nor does it require that ethics always 
be portrayed as an impediment or obstacle to technological development. Ra-
ther it demands, as such developments always have, that human agents employ 
appropriate ingenuity in the framing of suitable metaphors, the drawing of the 
most appropriate analogies, and reasoning by extrapolation from the known to 
the unknown in the continuing quest to order and organize the perplexing op-
portunities and risks that innovation and change otherwise invariably pose. 
Accordingly, my intent in offering these Precepts is to suggest areas of 
consensus and agreement discerned among contending practitioners and stake-
holders in this debate about the increasing military reliance upon unmanned 
systems, and to suggest the norms emerging from this debate that might serve 
to guide (if not strictly govern) the behavior of states, militaries, and those in-
volved in the development, testing and manufacture of present and future un-
manned systems. I likewise contend that discussion of the meaning, application, 
and refinement of these precepts as “soft-law” guidelines for proper use of un-
manned systems would be substantially more efficacious than further moral 
“hand-wringing” over their potential risks, let alone a rush to legislation that 
would have both unenforceable and unintended harmful consequences. I have 
personally advocated instead for a summit of practitioners and stakeholders to 
develop, improve, and disseminate guidance (such as these Precepts) emerging 
from practice and from the debate on the limits of acceptable practice in the 
contrasting views of current stakeholders. This would mirror the best practices 
of geneticists in the 1970s and 80s (the Asilomar Moratorium) and of nuclear 
scientists in the 1950s and 1960s (the Pugwash Conventions) in designing and 
disseminating what proved to be highly effective precautions for their respec-
tive investigations. 
I have attempted to demonstrate that there is far more consensus than we 
have been able to discern among adversarial parties arguing about ethics and 
law in such matters than we have heretofore been able to discern. That emerg-
ing consensus, in turn, points toward a more productive regime of governance 
and regulation to assure against the risk of unintended harm and consequences 
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